战略经济学(四).ppt

Economics of StrategyChapter 3Vertical Boundaries of the FirmBesanko, Dranove, Shanley and SchaeferVertical ChainlBegins with the acquisition of raw materialslEnds with the sale of finished goods/serviceslIncludes support services such as finance and marketinglOrganizing the vertical chain is an important part of business strategyVertical Boundaries of the FirmlWhich steps of the vertical chain are to be performed inside the firm?lWhich steps of the vertical chain to be out-sourced?lChoice between the “invisible hand” of the market and the “visible hand” of the organization (Make or Buy)Vertically Integrated FirmslIn a vertically integrated firm, many of the steps in the vertical chain are performed in-house. Example: UIBElSome firms choose to outsource many of the vertical chain tasks and become vertically disintegrated. Example: NikeMake versus BuylDecision depends on the costs and benefits of using the market as opposed to performing the task in-houselOutside specialists may perform a task better than the firm canlIntermediate solutions are possible (Examples: Strategic alliances with suppliers, Joint ventures)上游下游上游下游Support ServiceslAccountinglFinancelLegal SupportlMarketinglPlanninglHuman Resource ManagementSupport ServiceslSupport services can be major sources of value creationUPS LogisticsToyota Human Resource ManagerNike - MarketingDefining BoundarieslFirms need to define their vertical boundaries lConsiderations Economies of scale achieved by market firms Value of market disciplineEase of coordination of production flows in-house Transactions costs when dealing with market firms Some Make-or-Buy FallacieslFirm should make rather than buy assets that provide competitive advantageslOutsourcing an activity eliminates the cost of that activitylBackward integration captures the profit margin of the supplierlBackward integration insures against the risk of high input priceslIt makes sense to tie up the distribution channel in order to deny access to the rivalsReasons to Buy rather than Make lMarket firms (outside specialists) may have patents/proprietary information that makes low cost production possiblelMarket firms can achieve economies of scale that in-house units cannotlMarket firms are subject to market discipline, whereas in-house units may be able to hide their inefficiencies behind overall corporate success (Agency and influence costs)Economies of ScaleMake-or-Buy in InsurancelBuying insurance utilizes economies of scale available to insurerslLarge firms with sufficient capital can “self-insure”案例：案例：Self-Insurance by British PetroleumlBP self-insures large losses but buys insurance for small losseslWhyAgency and Influence CostslThe incentives to be inefficient and innovative are weaker when a task is performed in-houselAgency costs are particularly problematic if the task is performed by a “cost center” within an organizationl忽视代理成本优于消除代理成本lIt is difficult to internally replicate the incentives faced by market firmsInfluence costslIn addition to agency costs, performing a task in-house will lead to “influence costs” as welll“Internal Capital Markets” allocates scarce capitallAllocations can be favorably affected by influence activitieslResources consumed by influence activities represent “influence costs”l为什么在过去几十年里，GM在拥有世界上最高生产量的同时，它的许多零部件供应部门的成本也是最高的Reasons to MakelCosts imposed by poor coordinationlReluctance of partners to develop and share valuable private informationlTransactions cost that can be avoided by performing the task in-houselEach problem can be traced to difficulties in contractingRole of ContractslFirms often use contracts when certain tasks are performed outside the firmlContracts listthe set of tasks that need to be performed the remedies if one party fails to fulfill its obligationContractslContracts protect each party to a transaction from opportunistic behavior of other(s)lContracts ability to provide this protection depends onthe “completeness” of contractsthe body of contract lawComplete ContractlA complete contract stipulates what each party should do for every possible contingencylNo party can exploit others weaknesseslTo create a compete contract one should be able to contemplate all possible contingencieslOne should be able to “map” from each possible contingency to a set of actionslOne should be able to define and measure performanceslOne should be able to enforce the contractComplete Contract (Continued)lTo enforce a contract, an outside party (judge, arbitrator) should be able toobserve the contingencyobserve the actions by the partiesimpose the stated penalties for non-performancelReal life contracts are usually incomplete contractsIncomplete Contracts lIncomplete contractsInvolve some ambiguitiesNeed not anticipate all possible contingenciesDo not spell out rights and responsibilities of parties completelyFactors that Prevent Complete ContractinglBounded rationalitylDifficulties in specifying/measuring performancelAsymmetric informationBounded RationalitylIndi