美国战略和预算评估中心-更多相同的？俄罗斯军队的未来及其变革能力（英）-2024.3.docx

Crutrrf11rStraU<icH1.dBMl11hryAjekuwi心MOREOFTHESAME?THEFUTUREOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARYANDITSABI1.ITYTOCHANGEKATHERINEKJE1.1.STROME1.GINMoreofthesame?THEFUTUREOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARYANDITSABI1.ITYTOCHANGEKATHERINEKJE1.1.STROME1.GINCSBACimUrKrtndee*ndDnHarvkstxmntUn2024ABOUTTHECENTERFORSTRATEGICANDBUDGETARYASSESSMENTS(CSBA)TheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessmentsisanindependent,nonpartisanpolicyresearchinstituteestablishedtopromoteinnovativethinkinganddebateaboutnationalsecuritystrategyandinvestmentoptions.CSBA,sanalysisfocusesonkeyquestionsrelatedtoexistingandemergingthreatstoU.S.nationalsecurity,anditsgoalistoenablepolicymakerstomakeinformeddecisionsonmattersofstrategy,securitypolicy,andresourceallocation.©2024CenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.Allrightsreserved.ABOUTTHEAUTHORDr.KatherineKjellstromElginisaFellowattheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments.Shebringsrigorousresearchtopolicydiscussionsandhasheldpositionsinbothacademicandpolicyorganizations.PriortojoiningCSBA,sheservedasaDAADPost-DoctoralFellowattheForeignPolicyInstituteofJohnsHopkinsSchoolofAdvancedInternationalStudies(SAIS).Dr.ElginhasalsoworkedattheBrookingsInstitutionandwiththe1.ongTermStrategyGroupinWashington,D.C.In2018,sheservedasavisitingfellowattheInstituteforSecurity&DevelopmentPolicyinStockholm,Sweden.Dr.ElginearnedherPh.D.inPublicAffairs(SecurityStudies)fromPrincetonUniversity'sSchoolofPublic&InternationalAffairs.AtPrinceton,sheservedasthedirectoroftheCenterforInternationalSecurityStudies1StrategicEducationInitiative,leadingtheuniversity'sprogramforeducatingandmentoringstudentswithaninterestinnationalandinternationalsecurity.Dr.ElginalsoearnedherA.B.inPoliticsfromPrincetonUniversity.Dr.ElginspeaksFrench,Russian,andSwedish.ACKNOW1.EDGMENTSThisreportbenefitedfromthecontributionsofmany.TheauthorwouldliketothankTimSadovforhissubstantialcontributionstohistoricalandRussian-languageresearchandJoeRoss,AlidaBlendonohy,ChrisRadcliffe,andMaryWatermanfortheirresearchsupport.ThomasC.MahnkenandEvanB.Montgomeryprovidedinvaluablefeedback,asdidothermembersoftheCSBAcommunity,includingEricEdelman,MichaelHunzeker,TravisSharp,andJanvanTol.Theauthorwouldalsoliketothanktheparticipantsinaseriesofworkshopsthatsupportedtheproject,particularlyDimaAdamsky,aswellasthosewhoreviewedearlierversionsofthisreport.Finally,theauthorthanksEleanorShioriHughesandothersfortheireditingandpublicationsupport.Theanalysisandfindingspresentedherearesolelytheresponsibilityoftheauthors.CSBAreceivesfundingfromabroadanddiversegroupofcontributors,includingprivatefoundations,governmentagencies,andcorporations.Acompletelistoftheseorganizationscanbefoundonourwebsiteatwww.csbaonline.org/about/contributors.ThispublicationwasfundedbytheRussiaStrategicInitiative,U.S.EuropeanCommand.TheviewsexpressedinthispublicationdonotnecessarilyrepresenttheviewsoftheDepartmentofDefenseortheUnitedStatesgovernment.ContentsEXECUTIVESUMMARYiMainFindingsiiRecommendationsivCHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION1TheProblem2CHAPTER 2: REFORMWITHRUSSIANCHARACTERISTICS9CharacteristicsoftheRussianMilitary10HowtheRussianMilitaryReforms23TendenciesofRussianReform30CHAPTER 3: AFRAMEWORKFORFORECASTINGRUSSIANREFORMAMBITIONANDSUCCESS35CHAPTER 4: THREECASESOFRUSSIANMI1.ITARYREFORMEFFORTS41TheMiliutinReforms42The1.ost1990s46TheNew1.ookReforms50Conclusions57CHAPTER 5: IMP1.ICATIONSANDCONC1.USION61WhattheFutureHolds62ImplicationsfortheUnitedStatesanditsAllies65Recommendations68RevisitingPokazukhaReforms711.ISTOFACRONYMS74FIGURESFIGURE 1: THEASSESSEDORGANIZATIONANDCHAINOFCOMMANDOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARY14FIGURE 2: FEATURESOFANIDEA1.REFORMPROCESS24TAB1.ESTABLE 1: KEYORGANIZATIONA1.CHARACTERISTICSOFTHERUSSIANMI1.ITARY10TABLE 2: THEMESOFANIDEA1.REFORMPROCESS25TABLE 3: AFRAMEWORKOFRUSSIANMI1.ITARYREFORM37TABLE 4: REVISITINGTHEFRAMEWORKOFRUSSIANMI1.ITARYREFORM65ExecutiveSummaryAssessingthetypeofthreatthatRussiaislikelytoposeintheaftermathofthewarinUkraineisacriticalchallengefortheUnitedStatesanditsallies.The2022NationalDefenseStrategy(NDS)describedRussiaasanacutethreat/5However,sincethereleaseoftheNDS,UkrainianforceshavecontinuedtoinflictseverecostsontheRussianmilitary,damagingRussianequipmentanddepletingRussianstockpiles.Meanwhile,theinternationalcommunityhasrestrictedRussia,saccesstoadvancedtechnology,inhibitingtheKremlin,sabilitytoreconstitute,andtheenlargementofNATOhasdramaticallyreshapedthethreatenvironmentthatMoscowfaces.Still,theRussianmilitarymaintainstheworld,slargestnucleararsenal,importantcomponentsofitsarmedforcesremainrelativelyuntouched,andtheRussiangovernmentappearstocontinuetoharborrevisionistintentions.Giventhesedevelopments,whatWintheRussianmilitarylooklikeinthefuture?Twoschoolsofthoughtareemerging.ThefirstpostulatesthattheRussianmilitaryWinremainasignificantthreatandperhapsbecomeaverydifferentandevenmoreseriousone.ThisargumentholdsthattheRussianmilitaryWnlreconstituteinarel